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Abstract: The growing market for smart home IoT de-
vices promises new conveniences for consumers while
presenting new challenges for preserving privacy within
the home. Many smart home devices have always-on
sensors that capture users’ offline activities in their liv-
ing spaces and transmit information about these activi-
ties on the Internet. In this paper, we demonstrate that
an ISP or other network observer can infer privacy sensi-
tive in-home activities by analyzing Internet traffic from
smart homes containing commercially-available IoT de-
vices even when the devices use encryption. We evaluate
several strategies for mitigating the privacy risks asso-
ciated with smart home device traffic, including block-
ing, tunneling, and rate-shaping. Our experiments show
that traffic shaping can effectively and practically mit-
igate many privacy risks associated with smart home
IoT devices. We find that 40KB/s extra bandwidth us-
age is enough to protect user activities from a passive
network adversary. This bandwidth cost is well within
the Internet speed limits and data caps for many smart
homes.
Keywords: Privacy, Internet-of-things, smart homes,
traffic analysis
1 Introduction
Internet-connected physical devices have rapidly in-
creased in popularity and commercial availability within
the past several years. This trend, the Internet of Things
(IoT), includes many consumer products that often re-
place conventional non-networked home appliances or
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Fig. 1. Traffic rate to and from a Sense Sleep Monitor over a 12-
hour period. A network observer could easily determine a user’s
sleeping habits without needing access to encrypted traffic con-
tent.
introduce new technologies into consumer homes. Unfor-
tunately, a future where “smart” homes are filled with
numerous Internet-connected devices can also introduce
significant privacy concerns.
Many smart home devices have always-on sensors
that capture users’ offline activities in their living spaces
and transmit information about these activities outside
of the home, typically to cloud services run by device
manufacturers. Examples of offline activities recorded
by currently available smart home devices include sleep-
ing patte ns [6, 34], exercise routines [13], child behav-
iors [19], medical information [27], and sexual activ-
ity [25]. Even if a smart home device is not designed to
capture privacy sensitive activities, such activities may
indirectly influence information collected by device sen-
sors, allowing them to be id ntified b inference tech-
niques.
Consumers are generally concerned about the pri-
vacy implications of smart home devices. Surveys have
shown th t many individuals do not want specific in-
home behaviors to be recorded or shared by IoT de-
vices [12]. While purchasers of smart home devices
might expect that the device manufacturer can track
how a consumer uses its device, smart home network
traffic is susceptible to eavesdropping by other parties.
Such parties include Internet service providers (ISPs),
Wi-Fi eavesdroppers, or state-level surveillance entities.
The privacy threat posed by ISPs is especially con-
cerning given the recent reversal of the FCC’s broad-
band consumer privacy rules [39]. These rules, approved
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in October 2016 but never enacted, placed restrictions
on ISPs’ ability to collect and use consumer informa-
tion gleaned from traffic analysis or deep packet inspec-
tion [17]. In the debate surrounding these regulations,
some argued that the privacy risks of smart home de-
vice traffic analysis are minimal, because the increasing
pervasiveness of encryption prevents network observers
from viewing sensitive data in traffic content [37]. In this
paper, we demonstrate that despite the broad adoption
of transport layer encryption, smart home traffic meta-
data is sufficient for a passive network adversary to infer
sensitive in-home activities (Figure 1). We present an at-
tack on user privacy using metadata from these devices
that is effective even when devices use encryption.
The attack requires two steps:
1. Use Domain Name System (DNS) queries or de-
vice fingerprinting to identify smart home devices
from network traffic. This alone can be a privacy
risk. For example, learning that a someone owns an
IoT blood sugar monitor or pacemaker effectively
reveals a diabetes or heart-disease diagnosis, respec-
tively.
2. Infer user activities from changes in device traffic
rates. Once an adversary identifies a device and
knows its purpose, device states, reflected in traf-
fic rates, directly imply user behaviors.
We tested this attack on several commercially available
smart home devices and found that all revealed po-
tentially private user behaviors through network traf-
fic metadata. Traffic rates from a Sense sleep monitor
revealed consumer sleep patterns, traffic rates from a
Belkin WeMo switch revealed when a physical appli-
ance in a smart home is turned on or off, and traffic
rates from a Nest Cam Indoor security camera revealed
when a user is actively monitoring the camera feed or
when the camera detects motion in a user’s home. The
general effectiveness of this attack across smart home
device types and manufacturers motivates the need for
technical privacy protection strategies.
In testing smart home devices, we discover that
many devices do not work without an active Internet
connection. This means that firewalling smart home de-
vices from the Internet is not an effective means of mit-
igating the problem of traffic rate metadata. Addition-
ally, tunneling smart home traffic through a VPN makes
the traffic metadata privacy attack considerably more
challenging, but does not provide guaranteed protec-
tion. We find that certain common device combinations
and user activity patterns minimize the ability of a VPN
to obfuscate smart home traffic metadata.
We demonstrate that traffic shaping by independent
link padding (ILP) provably prevents the metadata at-
tack while preserving device functionality. ILP involves
shaping traffic rates to match a predetermined rate or
schedule, thereby exposing no information about device
behavior to an adversary. Implementations typically in-
volve padding or fragmenting all packets to a constant
size and buffering device traffic or sending cover traffic
to enforce the predetermined rate. We empirically de-
termined shaped traffic rates resulting in low bandwidth
overheads and tolerable network latencies for a variety
of smart home devices.
For smart homes without devices that stream audio
or video, we found that only a maximum of 7.5 KB/s of
cover traffic is needed to completely mask user activities.
This is < 0.4% of the 2016 average broadband upload
and download speeds in the United States [30]. This rate
of cover traffic would result in approximately 19GB of
extra data used per month, much less than the 1TB
monthly broadband data caps enforced by the largest
United States and Canadian ISPs [1, 32].
For smart homes with devices that stream audio or
video, we found that no more than 40KB/s of cover traf-
fic per household was needed for effective ILP shaping.
While more costly than shaping for non-A/V devices,
it is still < 2% of the average upload speeds of United
States broadband internet.
Although ILP shaping is well-understood, it is typ-
ically dismissed as requiring excessive latency or band-
width overhead to be practical for real-world use. Our
results contradict this common belief. ILP traffic shap-
ing is a reasonable privacy protection method for smart
homes with rate-limited broadband access or data caps.
2 Related Work
This paper draws on a rich history of related research on
traffic analysis attacks and prevention techniques. The
attack we describe is similar in spirit to the Fingerprint
and Timing-based Snooping (FATS) attack presented
by Srinivasan et al. [36]. The FATS attack involves activ-
ity detection, room classification, sensor classification,
and activity recognition from Wi-Fi traffic metadata
from a sensor network deployed in the home—the pre-
cursor to today’s smart home IoT devices. In contrast to
the attacks that we present, the FATS attack relies on
wireless network traffic instead of a observations from
a last-mile Internet service provider or other adversary
located on the WAN. This context allows techniques
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such as radio fingerprinting and signal attenuation that
are not available in the context we consider. Our work
demonstrates that traffic analyses attacks in the style
of FATS are as effective for the current generation of
consumer IoT devices as they were for sensor networks
a decade ago.
Our attack draws more broadly from the extensive
literature on side-channel privacy attacks in the web and
other contexts. Several such attacks have been demon-
strated on anonymity networks [5, 28]. Internet brows-
ing habits are also subject to privacy breaches by web-
site fingerprinting attacks using network traffic meta-
data [18, 21, 42]. Network traffic metadata has also been
used to perform user and device fingerprinting by a va-
riety of techniques, including correlating IP ID header
fields [9], clock skews from the TCP timestamp op-
tion [24], and hidden Markov models trained on Netflow
data [41].
Our proposed traffic shaping solution was moti-
vated by existing work on traffic shaping in anonymity
networks. Independent link padding algorithms, which
force traffic to match a predefined schedule or dis-
tribution, are well-studied [16, 40]. Fu, et al. de-
veloped a Bayesian derivation of detection rates for
constant-interval-timing (CIT) versus variable-interval-
timing (VIT) independent link padding [20], and show
that real-world system jitter makes CIT shaping inef-
fective for an adversary with lots of low-noise data. It is
generally believed that independent link padding algo-
rithms require too much latency or bandwidth overhead
to be feasible in practice [16]. Our results challenge this
notion in the IoT context.
Many dependent link padding techniques that rely
on feedback from shaped traffic have also been pre-
sented. Wang et al. designed a dependent link padding
algorithm that uses matched packet schedules to pre-
vent an observer of a mix node in an anonymity network
from pairing incoming flows with outgoing flows [43].
Shmatikov et al. developed an adaptive padding algo-
rithm that forces inter-packet intervals of short-lived
web communications through an anonymity network
node to match a pre-specified probability distribu-
tion [35]. Although such techniques require less overhead
than independent link padding algorithms, most can-
not prevent the attack we describe. Using feedback from
shaped traffic, periods of higher or lower traffic rates are
retained by dependent link padding algorithms. This ap-
proach is acceptable in the anonymity network context
where the goal is to prevent correlation of source and
destination across multiple flows, but it is unacceptable
if we wish to prevent identification of traffic correlated
with user activities within a single flow.
Previous work has also explored how sensitive prop-
erties of data can be hidden through statistical means.
Researchers have used differential privacy, for instance,
to place bounds on an attacker’s ability to learn sensitive
information through strategic database querying [15].
This inspires our own research: can we offer strong,
provable guarantees of privacy from traffic analysis at-
tacks on smart home devices?
3 Threat Model
Our analysis focuses on the abilities of a passive network
observer with access to last-mile Internet traffic into and
out of a smart home. We consider our adversary to have
capabilities similar to those of an ISP. The adversary’s
goal is to infer users’ in-home activities from smart home
device network traffic.
Traffic collection can occur at the flow level (us-
ing IPFIX or NetFlow) or at the individual packet level
(storing data in a standard pcap format). ISPs regularly
collect flow-level traffic records for network management
purposes. The possibility of inferring sensitive user in-
formation from these records is especially worrisome as
it would require no change to existing data collection
procedures. Our proposed traffic shaping solution pro-
tects consumer privacy against adversaries with Netflow
data or packet captures.
Our adversary is not active and does not need to
manipulate traffic to or from the smart home to con-
duct the attack. We assume that the adversary may or
may not have access to local area network (LAN) traf-
fic from within the smart home network. Some ISPs,
for instance, provide customers with a home gateway
router owned by the ISP. An ISP with LAN data can
more easily perform the traffic metadata privacy attack
(Section 5). However, customers can purchase and con-
nect their own router or Wi-Fi access point to the ISP-
provided router, creating a new LAN invisible to the
ISP. In either case, our proposed traffic-shaping solu-
tion can be implemented on a third-party hub/router
or individual devices themselves. Smart home device
traffic is therefore shaped before reaching an adversary-
controlled router.
We assume that packet contents are encrypted and
the adversary must rely on traffic rate and packet header
metadata to infer user activities. In fact, almost all
IoT devices we tested use TLS/SSL when communi-
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cating with first and third party cloud servers. Given
the increasing focus on security in the IoT community,
encrypted communications will likely become standard
for smart home devices. By ignoring packet contents,
our privacy attack indicates that sensitive information
about user activities is still at risk even when industry
best practices for data encryption are in place.
Finally, we assume that the passive network adver-
sary can obtain a database of labeled traffic from smart
home devices for training machine learning algorithms.
We do not bound our adversary’s ability to analyze ex-
ample traffic and assume that they can continuously
monitor a target smart home’s traffic if it allows them
to better conduct the traffic metadata attack.
4 Experiment Setup
We set up a laboratory smart home environment with
several commercially-available IoT devices as a testbed
for performing our traffic metadata attack and develop-
ing our privacy protection strategy.
We configured a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B as an
802.11n wireless access point for use as the laboratory
smart home’s gateway router. The Raspberry Pi 3 has
a built-in WiFi antenna, so no additional hardware was
needed. The Raspberry Pi ran the Raspbian Jessie OS,
a version of Debian Linux optimized for the Raspberry
Pi platform. Hostapd (host access point daemon) en-
abled mac80211-compliant access point and authentica-
tion server services. Dnsmasq enabled DNS and DHCP
services. An iptables network address translator (NAT)
connected the Raspberry Pi’s wireless interface to the
wired interface connected by Ethernet to the Internet.
This setup allowed us to record all network traf-
fic to and from the smart home devices connected to
the Raspberry Pi’s Wi-Fi network as pcaps and IPFIX
records. The Raspberry Pi also provided a convenient
platform for implementing our proposed traffic shaping
solution. Because many commodity home routers also
run some version of Linux [23], this implementation is
widely deployable.
We included the following popular IoT devices in
our laboratory smart home, covering a range of device
types, manufacturers, and privacy concerns:
1. Sense Sleep Monitor [34]
2. Nest Cam Indoor security camera [29].
3. Amcrest WiFi Security IP Camera [4].
4. Belkin WeMo switch [7].
5. TP-Link WiFi Smart Plug [38].
6. Orvibo Smart WiFi Socket [31].
7. Amazon Echo [3].
The Sense Sleep Monitor infers users’ sleep patterns
and sleeping environment using built-in motion, light,
temperature, air quality, and microphone sensors. The
Amcrest and Nest cameras are always-on video cam-
eras that allow motion detection and live streaming via
cloud-based web and mobile applications. The WeMo,
TP-Link, and Orvibo devices are electrical outlets with
an on/off switch that can be remotely controlled by a
smartphone application. The Amazon Echo is a voice-
controlled personal assistant that responds to user
queries and can interface with other cloud-based ser-
vices and IoT devices.
These devices are by no means exhaustive of the
wide range of available IoT smart home products. How-
ever, they encompass a variety of device types from large
and small manufacturers. Given the effectiveness of traf-
fic rate privacy attacks on all tested devices, we believe
that smart home owners should be concerned about traf-
fic rate metadata across all types of smart home devices.
5 Traffic Rate Privacy Attack
The smart home traffic rate metadata attack has two
components: device identification and activity inference.
At a high level, the adversary leverages devices’
known specific purposes to map changes in traffic rates
to user activities. As a simple example, an adversary
might first identify that a particular traffic flow is from
a smart outlet. Smart outlets generally have only two
functions (turn on and turn off), so if the flow indi-
cates a spike in traffic rate at a particular time, the
adversary can infer that the outlet was turned on or off
at that time. The following subsections describe each
step in this attack in detail with case studies from
commercially-available smart home devices.
5.1 Device Identification
First, the adversary associates individual traffic flows
with a known type of device. We mean "traffic
flow" in the same sense as it is used in Net-
Flow: a flow is a set of packets associated with
a 5-tuple of sender_ip, recipient_ip, sender_port,
recipient_port, and protocol within some time win-
dow. There are several methods to perform device iden-
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tification depending on the information available to the
attacker.
5.1.1 Using MAC Addresses
An attacker with smart home LAN data can use the first
three bytes of device MAC addresses (the organizational
unique identifier) to assign manufacturer labels to each
flow. Knowing devices’ manufacturers makes the follow-
ing DNS and traffic rate techniques easier because the
space of possible device identities is reduced. However,
the following techniques are still effective for a last-mile
observer without device MAC addresses.
5.1.2 Using DNS Queries
DNS queries associated with each flow can often be as-
sociated with a particular device. We recorded DNS
queries from our smart home laboratory and found that
4 out of 7 devices could be uniquely identified by inspec-
tion of DNS queries alone: the Sense Sleep Monitor, the
Nest Camera, the Amcrest Security Camera, and the
Amazon Echo (Figure 2). For example, the Nest Cam-
era queried domains from dropcam.com (the predeces-
sor to the Nest Camera), while the Sense sleep monitor
queried domains from hello.is (the company that makes
the Sense). An adversary could use a laboratory setup
like our own to learn these mappings or perform reverse
DNS lookups to pair service IPs with device-identifying
domain names.
However, the remaining 3 devices issued DNS
queries for domains that could only be associated with
a manufacturer (but not a particular device) or with a
third-party cloud hosting service (e.g. Amazon AWS).
Flows from these devices are more difficult to identify,
but we found that all devices in this category issued
DNS queries for more than one domain. Therefore, the
set of domains may be unique for each device from a
particular manufacturer, providing a device-type finger-
print that can be used for identification. An adversary
could learn the unique arrangement of domains used by
each device and use them to identify flows in NetFlow
records or packet captures.
5.1.3 Using Traffic Rates
If DNS queries and/or MAC addresses are insufficient
for identifying the devices that correspond to traffic
Device DNS Queries
Sense Sleep Monitor hello-audio.s3.amazonaws.com
hello-firmware.s3.amazonaws.com
messeji.hello.is
ntp.hello.is
sense-in.hello.is
time.hello.is
Nest Security Camera nexus.dropcam.com
oculus519-vir.dropcam.com
Amcrest Security Camera amcrestcloud.com
command-3.amcrestcloud.com
ftp.amcrestcloud.com
media-amc-1.hostedcloudvideo.com
p2p.amcrestview.com
dh.amcrestsecurity.com
Belkin WeMo Switch prod1-fs-xbcs-net-1101221371.
us-east-1.elb.amazonaws.com
prod1-api-xbcs-net-889336557.
us-east-1.elb.amazonaws.com
TP-Link Smart Plug devs.tplinkcloud.com
uk.pool.ntp.org
Orvibo Smart Socket wiwo.orvibo.com
Amazon Echo ash2-accesspoint-a92.ap.spotify.com
device-metrics-us.amazon.com
ntp.amazon.com
pindorama.amazon.com
softwareupdates.amazon.com
Fig. 2. DNS queries from smart home devices during a represen-
tative packet capture. Many queries can be easily mapped to a
specific device or manufacturer.
flows, it is likely still possible to fingerprint devices us-
ing traffic rates. As a proof of concept, we collected two
hours worth of network traffic from six smart home de-
vices operating with minimal user interactions. We sep-
arated this traffic into flows corresponding to individual
devices and converted into time series vectors. Vector
elements contained the amount of traffic (bytes) sent or
received by the device in consecutive s-second samples.
We further divided these vectors into w-second win-
dows and extracted 2-element feature vectors containing
the mean and standard deviation of the traffic amounts
in the samples of each window. These feature vectors
clustered well by the device responsible for the traffic
(Figure 3). A 3-nearest-neighbors classifier trained on
these feature vectors resulted in greater than 95% ac-
curacy classifications for a range of w and s (Figure 4).
Accuracies were determined by 10-fold stratified cross-
validation on the training set.
Surprisingly, simple traffic features can distinguish
devices that belong to the same category of smart home
appliance. For example, the mean traffic volumes of the
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Fig. 4. Supervised machine learning can accurately fingerprint
smart home devices using Internet traffic rates. These plots show
the accuracy of a 3-nearest-neighbors classifier identifying which
of six commercially-available smart home devices generated the
traffic within a time window for varying window size and sampling
rate. Accuracies determined by 10-fold stratified cross-validation.
Nest and Amcrest security cameras differed by almost
an order of magnitude over the data collection period.
In more complex scenarios there are many addi-
tional features of network traffic that could be used
for device identification [22]. These include the propor-
tion of SYN and ACK packets per flow, the number
of packets in a flow, and distributions of inter-packet
intervals. There are also a variety of machine learning
techniques beyond the k-nearest-neighbors algorithm we
tested that could be applied to device identification. An
adversary can leverage any number of features or algo-
rithms depending on the smart home devices they wish
to identify and prior knowledge of their target.
Future research using data from an ISP could de-
velop more advanced techniques for smart home device
fingerprinting on a larger scale.
5.2 Activity Inference from Traffic Rates
We performed a series of controlled experiments to test
the network behavior of smart home devices in response
to specific privacy-sensitive user activities. For all of the
tested devices, changes in traffic rate correlated to de-
vice state changes caused by user activities. An adver-
sary can use this knowledge after device identification
to infer user activities from changes in traffic rates.
Belkin WeMo Switch. The WeMo switch only
has two states, on and off, and the network send/receive
rates reflect this binarity. Figure 5 shows WeMo network
behavior when the switch is turned alternatively on and
off every 2 minutes using the WeMo smartphone app
and the physical button on the device. The spike in
traffic every time the switch changes state clearly reveals
user interactions with the device to an network observer.
Amazon Echo. We tested the Echo by asking a a
series of 3 questions (“what is the weather?,” “what time
is it?,” and “what is the distance to Paris?”) repeated 3
times, one question every 2 minutes. Figure 5 shows the
send/receive rates of SSL traffic between the Echo and
a single amazon.com IP address during the experiment.
Although the Echo sent and received other TCP traffic
to different domains during this time, we were able to
identify the stream that correlated with the questions.
A network-level attacker with their own test device can
also identify this stream and use the SSL traffic spikes
to infer when user interactions occurred.
Sense Sleep Monitor. Figure 1 shows
send/receive rates from the Sense over a 12 hour period
from 10:40pm to 10:40am. Notably, the send/receive
rate peaked at times corresponding with user activity.
The user shut off the light in the laboratory smart home
and went to bed at 12:30am, temporarily got out of bed
at 6:30am, and got out of bed in the morning at 9:15am.
We believe that the ability of an adversary to tell
when a user is sleeping, or at least in bed, from network
send/receive rates constitutes a significant privacy vul-
nerability. ISPs can already guess that users are sleep-
ing when network traffic from smartphones or PC web
browsers decreases at night; however, this relies on many
assumptions, e.g. that users only stop using their other
devices immediately prior to sleeping, that everyone in
the home sleeps at the same time and does not share
other devices, and that users do not leave their other
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devices running to perform network-intensive tasks or
updates while they sleep. The single-purpose IoT na-
ture of the Sense sleep monitor makes none of these
assumptions necessary to infer users’ sleeping patterns
from Sense traffic.
Nest Security Camera. Our observations of the
Nest camera indicate that it has at least two primary
modes of operation: a live streaming mode and a motion
detection mode. In the live streaming mode, the cam-
era’s video feed is either being actively viewed by the
user through the Nest web/mobile application or the
feed is being uploaded in real time to be stored on the
cloud. In the motion detection mode, the video stream
is not being uploaded, but the camera is monitoring the
stream locally for movement. If movement is observed,
the camera records a snapshot of the video and alerts
the user.
Figure 5 shows send/receive rates from the Nest
camera alternating between live streaming and motion
detection mode every 2 minutes. The traffic rate is or-
ders of magnitude higher in live streaming mode (and
a short time afterward until the camera is notified that
the user has stopped viewing the stream), allowing an
adversary to easily determine whether or not the cam-
era’s live feed is being actively viewed or recorded.
Figure 5 also shows that an adversary could eas-
ily determine when a Nest camera detects movement
when it is in motion detection mode. The camera was
pointed at a white screen with a black square that
changed location every two minutes. These simulated
motion events triggered clearly observable spikes in
network traffic. This predictable variability in network
send/receive rates would allow an adversary to observe
the presence and frequency of motion inside a smart
home.
These issues are significant privacy vulnerabilities
and physical security risks even though the content of
the video stream remains protected by encryption. It
should not be possible for a third party to be able to
determine when a security camera detects movement or
is being actively monitored.
6 Evaluating Current Defenses
In this section, we evaluate several existing techniques
known to prevent traffic analysis attacks in other con-
texts.
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Fig. 5. Network traffic send/receive rates of selected flows from
4 commercially-available smart home devices during controlled
experiments. Clearly visible changes in send/receive rates directly
correspond with user activities. A passive network observer aware
of this behavior could easily correlate smart home traffic rates
with device states and corresponding user activities.
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6.1 Blocking Traffic
One strategy for preventing activity inference is to pre-
vent an adversary from collecting smart home network
traffic in the first place. The most naive method is to
deploy a firewall that prevents all IoT device traffic from
leaving a smart home’s local network. Configuring such
a firewall is straightforward on an intermediate hub-like
device or the home gateway router. This approach, how-
ever, rests on an untested assumption: that devices do
not require cloud services to meet some basic function-
ality.
We tested the effect of removing Internet connec-
tivity from seven commercially-available devices while
maintaining the local network (Figure 6). Four of the
devices retained limited functionality, although without
many of the “smart” features which distinguish these de-
vices from their non-IoT analogs. The remaining three
devices had no functionality without Internet connec-
tion and were completely unusable. This was surprising,
because there is no technical reason why these devices
could not have continued to partially function. The sleep
monitor still could have reported current sleeping con-
ditions detected using on-device sensors. The security
cameras could have allowed a smartphone also on the
local network to view the video feed (e.g., for monitoring
an infant while in another room).
Rather than blocking all traffic indiscriminately, a
hub or router could use more advanced analysis to
discern what specific traffic from each device can be
blocked safely. If done correctly, smart home devices
could function effectively while particularly sensitive
traffic streams are prevented from leaving the home.
One possible approach is for device developers to in-
tentionally separate information sent to cloud servers
into multiple streams categorized by information type
and/or necessity for device functionality. A firewall
could then block specific streams to trade-off users’ pri-
vacy versus usability preferences.
However, developers are likely disincentivized to al-
low users to block specific information streams even if
if is technically feasible for them to do so. Without de-
veloper support, a third-party hub or router could po-
tentially learn what packets or flows from particular de-
vices can be blocked without excessively limiting func-
tionality. However, encrypted traffic contents and the
potential for delayed device failures makes this an open
research question.
6.2 Tunneling traffic
Another strategy for preventing device identification
and activity inference is to tunnel all smart home traffic
through a virtual private network (VPN). This would
impede a last-mile observer’s ability to split traffic into
individual flows and associate those flows with specific
devices.
A VPN wraps all traffic from an endpoint in an
additional transport layer, aggregating it into a single
flow. This flow has the source IP address of the home
gateway router and the destination IP address of the
server implementing the VPN exit point. In effect, an
adversary would see all traffic as originating and termi-
nating from a single pair of endpoints, rather than from
individual smart home devices (or the public IP address
of the smart home NAT) and individual cloud servers.
That aggregation could make device identification more
difficult. When many IoT devices send traffic simultane-
ously, noise variations in traffic rates of high-rate devices
could mask the entire traffic patterns of other devices.
VPNs in general make it difficult to determine which
variations in the overall traffic rate observed from out-
side a VPN correspond to individual devices, if the ad-
versary can even identify what those individual devices
were.
However, this increased attack difficulty does not
give a consumer any actual proof of privacy protection.
We have identified three cases where an adversary can
infer activity despite seeing only VPN traffic. In each
of these cases, an adversary can still fingerprint devices
using the rate of VPN traffic:
1. Single device. If a smart home has only one
IoT device, the VPN traffic rate will match the traffic
from that device. Although the adversary cannot use
DNS for device identification, they can leverage other
traffic rate signals for device fingerprinting. The attack
can then proceed as before.
2. Sparse activity. If there are multiple devices
that send traffic at different times, an adversary could
still identify events corresponding to single devices, since
many time windows would contain traffic from only a
single device. For example, a smart door lock and smart
sleep monitor are less likely to be recording user activi-
ties simultaneously. Traffic observations from particular
times of day are likely to contain non-background traffic
from only one of these devices. This will allow an adver-
sary to identify the active device within a time window
and perform activity inference as before.
3. Dominating device. Even if device traffic over-
laps, an observer could infer the presence of the device
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Device Functionality Description
Amazon Echo limited Can use as a bluetooth speaker with previously paired smartphone
Echo recognizes “Alexa" keyword but does not provide any voice-control features
Belkin WeMo Switch limited Can turn switch on/off with physical button on device
Cannot use smartphone app to control device even when phone on local network
Orvibo Smart Socket limited Can turn switch on/off with physical button on device or smartphone app on local network
TP-Link Smart Plug limited Can turn switch on/off with physical button on device or smartphone app on local network
Nest Security Camera none Unable to view video feed or receive detected motion notifications
Amcrest Security Camera none Unable to view video feed or control camera direction
Sense Sleep Monitor none Monitor does not record sleep data
Light-based UI does not reflect local sensor readings
Cannot use smartphone app to control device or access current data
Fig. 6. All tested commercially-available IoT devices had limited or no functionality when firewalled to prevent communication outside
of the smart home LAN. This suggests that device manufacturers should be encouraged to improve their “minimum reliable product.”
that sends the most traffic if it significantly overshad-
ows traffic from other devices. For example, traffic from
a security camera uploading live video will dominate
any traffic from less network-intensive devices such as
smart outlets. The adversary will be able to perform the
attack on the high traffic rate device unaffected by the
relatively small amount of traffic from the other devices.
At minimum, these three cases demonstrate that a
VPN can still reveal traffic rate patterns that make the
metadata privacy attack possible. This motivates more
technically sophisticated solutions that prevent the leak-
age of any information about user activities.
7 Traffic Shaping
A user cannot reasonably block smart home traffic from
leaving their home without making their devices unus-
able. While tunneling via a VPN does make the attack
somewhat more difficult, it does not provide any guar-
antee of privacy; a dedicated adversary could still use
the available traffic rate information from the VPN in
machine learning. Traffic shaping is the only solution
that can prevent the leak of rate information and thus
render the attack impossible. We propose traffic shap-
ing using independent link padding (ILP). ILP involves
shaping traffic rates to match a predetermined rate or
schedule, thereby exposing no information about device
behavior to an adversary. For a relatively low-cost, traf-
fic shaping can give a consumer strong guarantees of
smart home privacy without interfering with the basic
functioning of smart home devices.
7.1 Overview
One approach to traffic shaping that can guarantee
smart home privacy involves sending fixed-size packets
at a constant rate independent of the underlying device
traffic. This is a form of ILP that results in traffic rate
metadata with no information about device states and
corresponding user activities (Figure 7).
If the shaped send rate is lower than the rate of
device traffic, packets from the devices are delayed in a
queue until they can be sent at the shaped rate. If the
shaped rate is higher than the rate of device traffic, fake
packets (cover traffic) are added.
This results in a trade-off between latency and
bandwidth overhead. If a high shaped traffic rate is cho-
sen, little additional latency will be imposed on device
traffic, but lots of bandwidth will be needed for cover
traffic. If a low shaped traffic rate is chosen, less cover
traffic is needed, but device traffic could experience long
latencies. The shaped traffic rate should therefore be
chosen to minimize the amount of cover traffic needed
while imposing latency that doesn’t interfere with de-
vice function.
7.2 Traffic Shaping Implementation
To evaluate the device latency tolerances and corre-
sponding traffic shaping bandwidth costs, we built a
working traffic shaping implementation that we de-
ployed on our Raspberry Pi WiFi access point in our
smart home laboratory (Section 4). The implementa-
tion consists of two components: a VPN tunnel and a
traffic shaper.
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Fig. 7. Results of simulated traffic shaping by independent link
padding on combined traffic from 3 smart home deices: a Belkin
WeMo Switch, an Amazon Echo, and a Sense Sleep Monitor. All
packets were fragmented or padded to 512 bytes. Inter-packet
intervals were drawn from a normal distribution with mean 1s
and standard deviation 10ms. Note that traffic shaping masks
traffic spikes which correspond to user activities, preventing the
described traffic metadata privacy attack.
VPN tunnel. We use OpenVPN on an Amazon
EC2 t2.medium instance as the endpoint for traffic orig-
inating fro our smart home access point. Though a
VPN alone does not provide any guarantee of privacy
against the traffic rate metadata attack, it is a neces-
sary component of our implementation. Traffic shaping
requires that we send cover traffic when no real packets
are available. The VPN renders the real traffic packet
headers indistinguishable from cover traffic packet head-
ers.
The VPN also allows us to shape traffic going to the
smart home (download traffic) from Internet services.
We run the same traffic shaping implementation on the
VPN endpoint to prevent an adversary from inferring
user activities from download traffic metadata.
The only other requirement of the VPN is that it sit
outside of the last-mile observer’s view; for an adversary
like an ISP, this requires that the VPN have a different
service provider than the smart home itself.
Traffic shaper. We built our traffic shaping im-
plementation around the Linux kernel’s traffic control
systems, configurable via the tc command line tool.
Through traffic control, a user can modify the kernel’s
strategy for how it queues and sends network packets.
We use it to enforce maximum transmission rates and
prioritize device traffic over cover traffic on the network
interface responsible for the VPN tunnel, tun0.
Figure 8 shows how the traffic shaper is config-
ured to shape device and cover traffic so that it is sent
through the network interface at the required rate.
First, a user space program generates UDP cover
traffic sent to a dummy IP address. The VPN endpoint
drops all cover traffic sent to this address at the end of
the tunnel.
Low	priority
High	priority
Device	traffic
Generated	cover	traffic Shaped
traffic
Token	bucket
Fig. 8. The components of our traffic shaping implementation,
including cover traffic generation and traffic control in the kernel.
The token bucket shaper has a buffer size of 1 token, making it
equivalent to a fixed-rate leaky bucket. The rate of token arrival
is set to the desired shaped traffic rate. Device packets in the
high priority queue are always sent before cover packets in the
low priority queue.
Next, we create a new PRIO queuing discipline
(qdisc). The PRIO qdisc has three priority classes for
packets. If packets are available in a high-priority queue,
the qdisc will send those packets before sending pack-
ets from a lower-priority queue. We set a traffic control
filter so that device traffic is assigned to a high priority
queue, and generated cover traffic is sent to a lower pri-
ority queue. Therefore, device traffic always takes prece-
dence over cover traffic. Cover packets are generated at
a faster rate than the shaped traffic rate so there is al-
ways a cover packet ready to be sent if a device packet
isn’t available.
Finally, we replace the default first-in-first-out
queuing discipline of tun0 with a hierarchical token
bucket (HTB). We set the HTB as the parent of the
PRIO qdisc. When a packet is ready to transmit from
the PRIO qdisc, either from the high or low priority
queue, the interface attempts to grab a token from the
HTB. If a token is available, the packet is sent. Oth-
erwise, the interface must wait for a token to become
available. By setting the rate at which the HTB gener-
ates tokens and the maximum number of tokens avail-
able, we can enforce a fixed maximum rate of traffic on
the interface1.
Together, these three steps ensure that:
1. Traffic originating from the hub is sent out at a
constant rate, regardless of the activity happening
within the LAN
2. Device traffic takes precedence over cover traffic to
minimize device traffic latency.
1 Our configuration of the hierarchical token bucket effectively
makes it a fixed-rate leaky bucket.
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Our script to perform cover traffic generation and con-
figure the kernel’s traffic control takes less than 100 lines
of code. While we deployed this on our own Raspberry
Pi hub, it is readily-portable to any hub that uses a
Linux-based kernel.
7.3 Devices Tolerate High Latencies
We tested seven devices with our traffic shaping im-
plementation to determine how much shaping-induced
latency the devices could tolerate. We varied the shaped
traffic rate, measuring the average latency experienced
by all device packets and the maximum latency experi-
enced by any individual device packet. We were able to
find the lowest rate (and corresponding latency over-
head) at which each device still functions. The least
latency-tolerant device, the Amazon Echo, tolerated 0.6
seconds of average per-packet latency and 1.4 seconds of
maximum latency. The most tolerant device, the Sense
Sleep Monitor, tolerated 6.2 seconds of average per-
packet latency and 14.4 seconds of maximum latency.
Figure 9 reports latency measurements for all tested de-
vices at their lowest tolerated shaped traffic rate and the
effect of slower traffic on device function. All tolerances
are considerably longer than the <100ms of typical per-
packet network latency without traffic shaping.
7.4 Shaping Incurs Acceptable
Throughput Overhead
The bandwidth overhead of traffic shaping depends on
the shaped traffic rate and the network behavior of indi-
vidual devices. We measured the cover traffic bandwidth
required to shape at rates resulting in the highest net-
work latency tolerated by each device. If a device is idle
for long periods of time, the amount of cover traffic over-
head added on top of device traffic can equal the overall
shaped traffic rate (Figure 9). This would result in the
most bandwidth overhead for traffic shaping, because
no user activities are being concealed. Unsurprisingly,
devices of similar type required similar shaped traffic
rates.
Smart outlets/switches. Both the Orvibo Smart
Socket and TP-Link Smart Plug were very tolerant of
low traffic rates. The Orvibo withstood traffic shaping
to a rate of 0.25KB/s for upload and 0.25KB/s down-
load, while the TP-Link only required 0.5KB/s for up-
load and 0.5KB/s for download. Traffic shaping at the
rate required by the TP-Link switch would only con-
sume about 2.5GB of extra data per month. This sug-
gests that similarly low-bandwidth devices that do not
upload audio or video data could be successfully shaped
at a very low cost.
IP cameras. Shaping smart home traffic that in-
cludes an IP camera is understandably more costly due
to the bandwidth requirements of streaming video. The
Nest security camera required a shaped bandwidth of
at least 10KB/s upload and 10KB/s download in order
to maintain its functionality. The Amcrest camera, on
the other hand, experienced a more graceful degrada-
tion when faced with slower traffic rates. We did not
find a single point at which it was completely “broken.”
Rather, the video feed gradually got more and more
laggy. A user could decide to trade-off more video lag
for a lower shaping data overhead.
Personal assistant. The Amazon Echo also ex-
perienced a graceful degradation—as we lowered the
shaped traffic rate, the Echo would experience several
seconds of lag answering questions but was still func-
tional. However, when the traffic rate was shaped to
below 10KB/s upload and download, audio responses
to user questions would stop mid-playback.
7.5 Shaping is Feasible for Many Users
These findings demonstrate – perhaps counterintuitively
– that traffic shaping can be a cost-effective means to
guaranteeing privacy.
Network performance cost. According to the
Speedtest Market Report [30], the average upload speed
for fixed broadband in the United States was 2.36MB/s
(18.88Mb/s) as of June, 2016. For users with at least
2MB/s upload speed, a bandwidth overhead ≤ 40KB/s
(above the required shaping rate for any of our tested
devices) amounts to ≤ 2% of the user’s upload capacity.
This is low enough for shaping to protect all IoT de-
vices in a smart home from traffic metadata privacy at-
tacks without noticeably affecting Internet performance
of non-IoT traffic (e.g., traffic from a personal computer
or smartphone).
Unfortunately, there are certain regions where traf-
fic shaping may still be infeasible. Reports often cite
India as having some of the slowest connection speeds
in the Asia-Pacific region, with 1.7 megabits per sec-
ond average download speed in 2014 [8]. Traffic shaping
under those network conditions would consume a signif-
icant portion of a consumer’s entire bandwidth budget.
Data usage cost. Consumers with data caps may
not want to risk hitting a data cap and paying a pre-
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Device
Shaped
upload
traffic rate
Shaped
download
traffic rate
Avg. per-
packet
latency
Max. per-
packet
latency
Effects of traffic shaping
Amazon Echo 10 KB/s 10 KB/s 0.9s 4.4s
Echo answered questions with several seconds
delay. With slower traffic, the Echo does not
completely answer the question.
Belkin WeMo Switch 5.0 KB/s 2.5 KB/s 1.3s 2.6s
Works with few seconds of delay when switching
from smartphone app. With slower traffic, the
app loses connection to the switch.
Orvibo Smart Socket 0.25 KB/s 0.25 KB/s 0.8s 2.6s
Works with few seconds of delay when switching
from smartphone app. With slower traffic, the
app registers switching success, but the socket
does not actually change state.
TP-Link Smart Plug 0.5 KB/s 0.5 KB/s 0.8s 1.7s
Works with few seconds of delay when switching
from smartphone app. With slower traffic, the
app reported that the plug was unreachable.
Nest Security Camera 10 KB/s 10 KB/s 8.5s 17.6s
Video streamed with 10-15 seconds of lag and
app reported slow upload speeds. With slower
traffic the app lost connection with the camera.
Amcrest Security
Camera 35 KB/s 2.5 KB/s 1.5s 3.4s
Video streamed with 1 minute delay, but no
breakage. Could tolerate slower traffic, but with
>3 minute delay and less reliability.
Sense Sleep Monitor 2.5 KB/s 2.5 KB/s 0.4s 1.4s The smartphone app could still receive liveupdates. With slower traffic, live updates stop.
Fig. 9. Lowest tested shaped traffic rates and corresponding per-packet latencies at which smart home devices still function, dependent
on usage patterns and traffic load on the shaper. Reported per-packet latencies were measured in the upload direction. Most tested de-
vice were more latency-tolerant for shaping in the download direction. If a device is idle for long periods of time, the amount of cover
traffic overhead added on top of device traffic can equal the overall shaped traffic rate. This would result in the most bandwidth over-
head for traffic shaping, because no user activities are being concealed.
mium for extra data. Here, the cost of privacy can be
put into real monetary terms: what is the financial cost
of the data necessary to do traffic shaping? Our tests
show that the data usage costs of traffic shaping are
well within reach for consumers.
Many smart home devices have network behavior
similar to smart outlets and sleep monitors. For these
classes of devices that do not stream audio or video,
the data usage cost of shaping is very low. Traffic shap-
ing that adds 7.5KB/s bandwidth overhead, enough to
mask non-audio/video devices like smart outlets, would
only amount to 19GB of extra data used per month.
More data-intensive devices like cameras or baby moni-
tors that stream audio or video require a greater amount
of a data cap. Traffic shaping that adds 40KB/s band-
width overhead, enough to mask these data-intensive
devices with a high level of performance, would count
towards 104GB of a data cap in a month. This is a
worst-case scenario: in our experiments, we did not find
a device that required nearly that much bandwidth over-
head.
Though 104GB in a worst-case scenario sounds sub-
stantial, it is feasible within many home Internet data
plans around the world. Comcast, the largest ISP in the
United States by number of subscribers, imposes a one
terabyte per month limit on consumer home Internet
usage in at least 34 US states [32]. Above that, data
costs $10 per 50GB. Traffic shaping that adds 104GB of
data would only count towards 10% of a 1TB data cap
in a month.
A consumer can even use traffic shaping in countries
with more stringent data caps. Internet service provider
Telstra in Australia and Bell Internet in Canada, largest
in their respective countries, offer affordable plans to
users that have sufficiently large or unlimited Internet
usage limits [1, 2]. The mid-tier plan offered by Bell In-
ternet, for instance, provides 350GB of monthly usage,
25MB/s download speeds, and 10MB/s upload speeds
[1]. A consumer with a 350GB data cap could traffic
shape non-data-intensive device traffic with only 4% of
their overall data cap. If they wish to shape a camera or
similarly data-intensive device they would have to con-
sider the tradeoff between their desired level of privacy
and data usage carefully. Ultimately, privacy through
traffic shaping is still achievable with their data cap.
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However, there are still many contexts in which con-
sumers may not be able to afford the required overhead
of ILP traffic shaping. Future research could explore al-
ternative methods of traffic shaping that trade-off pri-
vacy for bandwidth usage. Such techniques might reveal
coarse-grained user information (such as when a user is
at home), but hide high-resolution details of user activ-
ities.
7.6 Real-world Deployment Considerations
Constant versus variable rate shaping The ILP
traffic shaping implementation we use to evaluate la-
tency and bandwidth costs is based on an algorithm
that shapes all outgoing traffic to a constant rate. In
application, constant rate traffic shaping provides in-
adequate protection against some types of adversaries
because it is impossible to actually send traffic at a per-
fectly constant rate. Due to “system jitter,” the shaped
traffic will have very small variations in rate that dis-
tinguish periods of high or low cover traffic. This allows
an adversary to probabilistically determine when traffic
underneath the shaping is being generated at a faster
or slower rate [20].
As an improvement to constant rate shaping, prior
work suggests variable interval timer (VIT) shaping.
VIT shaping uses a randomly varying send rate indepen-
dent of the traffic that the shaping is intended to obfus-
cate. If the varying rate has a high variance relative to
the system jitter, it is resilient against analyses that de-
feat constant rate shaping [20]. We performed a simula-
tion of VIT on recorded packet captures from our tested
devices. We found that VIT shaping adds no extra la-
tency or bandwidth overhead relative to our constant-
rate shaping implementation, because rate variations to
overwhelm system jitter are orders of magnitude smaller
than the total bandwidth overhead. A real world deploy-
ment of traffic shaping, however, would have to mind
this implementation detail.
Shaping an entire smart home. A third-party
hub or router deployment, like our traffic shaping im-
plementation, would be able to shape all traffic from all
devices in a smart home simultaneously.
Fortunately, shaping all of the traffic coming from
a smart home is just as cost-effective as shaping traffic
from a single device. We have found that the data cost
of ILP shaping does not scale linearly with the number
of devices.
In order to shape traffic from multiple devices, you
need a high enough shaped traffic rate to support the
latency tolerances of all devices sending within a time
window. In practice, this rate is less than the sum of the
rates that would be necessary to shape each device in-
dividually. Our simulation of VIT traffic shaping using
a 24-hour packet capture from multiple smart home de-
vices resulted in less cover traffic overhead than shaping
the most bandwidth-intensive device individually.
8 Discussion
Traffic shaping is practical. Our results indicate
that independent link padding is reasonable given smart
home Internet speeds and data caps. This is good news
in light of past research that indicates that ILP shaping
consumes too much extra data to be worthwhile [16].
On the contrary, traffic shaping is well-suited to
solving this particular smart home privacy problem. The
reasons for our success with ILP shaping are threefold:
First, smart home devices, especially non-A/V de-
vices, use very little network bandwidth compared to
smartphones and personal computers. This means that
relatively small amounts of cover traffic are necessary
to mask device activity. Smart home devices are also
much more tolerant of long network latencies than de-
vices with rich GUIs and interactive applications. This
allows smart devices to properly function under slower
network conditions imposed by ILP shaping.
Second, smart homes are likely to have Internet
speeds and data caps much higher than typically used
by consumers. For example, Comcast states that more
than 99% of consumers do not use their limit of 1TB
of data per month [33]. A constant small overhead due
to traffic shaping will therefore have little to no effect
on consumer experience. Compare this with servers run-
ning anonymity network nodes – a common deployment
situation for traffic shaping – that may always be at or
near their upload or download speed limits.
Third, ILP traffic shaping overheads do not scale
linearly with the number of devices. Adding more de-
vices to a smart home does not necessarily increase the
amount of shaping bandwidth needed. Although several
smart home devices we tested do upload audio or video
data and require higher traffic shaping rates, shaping at
these rates is sufficient to also protect all other devices
in the home.
The cost amortization of ILP shaping also raises the
possibility of shaping traffic elsewhere in the network to
spread bandwidth and data costs over even more de-
vices. Depending on the location of the adversary, traf-
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fic shaping could be performed at the level of an entire
apartment complex, hotel, college campus, or neighbor-
hood. In each of these cases, ILP traffic shaping could be
performed on the router or routers connecting the pro-
tected community to the rest of the Internet. As long as
the adversary is upstream of the shaper and appropri-
ate tunneling is used, no traffic rate metadata about any
device in the protected community would be available
to the adversary. Further research could explore the pri-
vacy protections and deployment issues of shaping IoT
device traffic at large scale.
Tunable traffic shaping. ILP traffic shaping
could be implemented to allow a consumer to actively
trade off privacy and data usage.
For example, a user might know that no privacy sen-
sitive activities will occur between midnight and 06:00.
The traffic shaper could simply shut off during that
period, using no data. Alternatively, the traffic shaper
could reduce the shaped traffic rate to still protect
lower-rate background traffic generated by devices while
using less bandwidth overhead. Of course, an adversary
would notice a change in the smart home traffic rate,
but this is acceptable as long as no privacy sensitive
activities (as determined by the user) are revealed.
An actual consumer product could make these
choices visible to the consumer. A smart home hub, for
example, could allow a consumer to selectively choose
which devices to protect via a smart phone interface. Or
the interface could present the consumer with a privacy
“knob” that allows them to tune their desired level of
privacy, and use information from the ISP to calculate
the actual financial cost of a certain privacy setting. In
this way the actual privacy trade-off can be made real
to the consumer.
An even smarter hub-like device could learn from
a user’s activities and preferences and make an opti-
mal tradeoff between privacy protection and cost. If the
privacy properties of such algorithms can be rigorously
defined and communicated in a user-friendly implemen-
tation, all smart home owners could benefit from pri-
vacy protections that adapt to their privacy values and
Internet service limits.
Options for device developers. Smart home de-
vice developers could implement devices with traffic
shaping built-in, but there are more effective ways for
developers of some devices to protect user privacy from
traffic metadata analysis.
Specifically, developers could implement devices
such that network traffic doesn’t directly correspond to
user behavior in real-time. A sleep monitor, for instance,
does not need to update a cloud service immediately
upon detecting that a user has gone to sleep—it could
delay the notification for up to several hours without
sacrificing functionality. Introducing long random de-
lays in cloud notifications would also reduce an adver-
sary’s confidence in inferred activities.
However, devices that rely on real-time network
communications are not amenable to these techniques.
For example, a smart personal assistant cannot wait
minutes to hours before answering a user’s questions.
Developers could improve the privacy of these devices
by making them more amenable to traffic shaping.
Trust in VPNs.Although our proposed solution of
using traffic shaping with a VPN prevents a consumer’s
last-mile internet provider from performing device iden-
tification and behavior inference, the VPN exit node’s
last-mile provider could potentially perform the same
attack. This problem could be addressed by having the
VPN provider act as an endpoint for traffic from mul-
tiple smart homes. In that case, it would be difficult
for the VPN’s last-mile provider to associate devices
with a particular smart home. We believe that such
“mixes” for smart homes could work in a similar fashion
as anonymity mixes in other contexts [11, 14].
Minimum reliable product. When testing our
devices, we could clearly see that many manufacturers
fail to include in the design of their device a strong “min-
imum reliable product” [26]. A smart device’s “mini-
mum reliable product” is its basic functionality in the
absence of cloud support. A strong minimum reliable
product could allow a user to enjoy their smart device
while blocking privacy-compromising network commu-
nications. For example, a smart thermostat should, at
the very least, match the functionality of a traditional
thermostat if its server goes down. Nest users in 2016 ex-
perienced what happens without a strong minimum re-
liable product when they lost heat in their homes due to
Internet disconnections—an obviously poor user experi-
ence [10]. Policymakers and consumer advocacy groups
should encourage device manufacturers to consider their
device’s minimum reliable product during development.
Policy measures have another role to play in encour-
aging the smart home ecosystem to protect consumers
against the improper use of traffic rate metadata. Pol-
icymakers could regulate how actors like Internet ser-
vice providers collect and use traffic rate information.
The Federal Communications Commission’s proposed
rules in 2016 impacted how Internet Service Providers
could collect and use data. Though those rules were
rolled back, we believe that future efforts should be sure
to consider the impact of privacy regulations on smart
homes.
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The privacy threat of traffic metadata analysis will con-
tinue to grow along with the market for IoT smart home
devices. In this paper, we demonstrate that a passive
network adversary can infer private in-home user activ-
ities from smart home traffic rates and packet headers
even when devices use encryption.
We find that many commercially-available smart
home devices do not function without network connec-
tivity. This makes the smart home network metadata
privacy problem unavoidable because these smart de-
vices necessarily connect to the Internet.
We show that traffic shaping by independent link
padding can effectively protect smart home privacy. De-
spite commonly held beliefs, traffic shaping can be de-
ployed in smart homes without significantly decreasing
network performance or increasing data costs.
We hope that consumers will become better aware
of smart home privacy vulnerabilities and incentivize
manufacturers to more carefully consider privacy issues
in the design of their products. While our proposed traf-
fic shaping solution is practical and sufficient, improved
regulation of ISPs and other passive network observers
may also be necessary to offset the unique privacy chal-
lenges posed by IoT devices.
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